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Counting Carbon James Morton Turner
Counting Carbon: The Politics of Carbon
Footprints and Climate Governance from
the Individual to the Global
•
James Morton Turner*
In June 2008, Verlyn Klinkenborg, a New York Times columnist, wondered if
“any phrase in the English language ever spread more quickly than ‘carbon foot-
print’?”1 Prior to 2006, public references to carbon footprints were almost non-
existent. But, between 2006 and 2008, carbon footprints seized public atten-
tion: Google searches for the term increased seven-fold, newspaper articles
referencing the concept jumped seventeen-fold, and peer-reviewed scholarly ar-
ticles addressing carbon footprints rose more than twenty-three-fold. Carbon
calculators and carbon offset programs proliferated on the Internet. In the face
of a climate crisis, the carbon footprint promised to engage individuals in ad-
dressing climate change. Then, just as quickly as the carbon footprint seized
public attention, the concept began to fade away. By 2011, media coverage of
and Google searches for “carbon footprint” were lower than in 2007 and many
online carbon calculators grew dated. It is tempting to dismiss the rise and fall
of the carbon footprint as symptomatic of concerns regarding climate change
more broadly: after the economic downturn in 2008 and the continued politici-
zation of climate change science, concerns over climate change, including car-
bon footprints, were pushed into the twilight of the issue-attention cycle, espe-
cially in the United States (US).2 To draw that conclusion, however, would mean
overlooking a dynamic and alternative arena of climate change politics and pol-
icy. Indeed, scholarly studies concerned with the carbon footprint concept have
increased rapidly since 2006 (see Figure 1).
Carbon footprints have become an important arena for climate change
governance that extends “‘beyond’ the realms of the international climate re-
gime.” As Okereke et al. have argued, such alternative “initiatives and practices
signiªcantly affect how we conceptualize and understand the nature of global
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mous reviewers. I also appreciate Anli Yang’s and Isabella Gambill’s research assistance.
1. New York Times, June 24, 2008.
2. Downs 1972; Kahn and Kotchen 2010; Nisbet 2011, 62.
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climate governance.”3 To the extent that scholars have considered the carbon
footprint speciªcally, it has been examined in the context of a suite of ap-
proaches to carbon accounting that encourage individual action on climate
change.4 Although some scholars have warned of the risks of the “individualiza-
tion of responsibility,” which privileges individual action over collective action,
most recent analyses have viewed carbon footprints and other such calculative
devices as important to “‘lift[ing] the veil’ on the social, economic, and ecologi-
cal relations that underpin the experience of consumption.”5 Drawing on a sci-
ence studies approach to consider the contingent nature of calculative devices—
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Figure 1
Occurrences of ‘carbon footprint’ each year relative to average annual occurrences be-
tween 2006 and 2001 in major world newspapers, Google searches, and scholarly publi-
cations respectively.
Each curve is normalized to its own average. Major newspaper coverage is based on Lexis-
Nexus searches of nine English newspapers worldwide; Google search data is drawn from
google.trends.com; scholarly publications is based Science Direct, Web of Science, and
Google Scholar searches.
such as carbon footprints—and governmentality studies to examine the intrin-
sic relationship between how problems are framed and remedied, this article
advances an analysis that builds on previous studies of carbon accounting, but
extends them in two important ways. First, I argue that the signiªcance of the
carbon footprint is not limited to the individualization of climate governance;
efforts to deªne and deploy carbon footprints have also contributed to an im-
portant conceptual shift towards consumption-based approaches in emissions
accounting. Second, whereas other scholars have drawn on carbon footprints to
shift analysis “downstream” to individual action, I consider how the evolution
of carbon footprints at the individual level intersects with discussions of emis-
sions responsibilities and mitigation at national and international scales.6
This article is organized around a conceptual history of the carbon foot-
print that draws on scholarly research, media coverage, online carbon footprint
calculators, and related gray literature produced by non-governmental organiza-
tions in the US and United Kingdom since the mid-1990s. It is organized into
four parts. First, I develop the conceptual framework for the analysis, based on
calculative devices and governmentality studies. Second, I examine the ªrst gen-
eration of carbon footprint calculators, which focused primarily on emissions
from direct energy use. This approach—which I label Carbon Footprint 1.0—
prioritized fossil-fuel emissions in its assessment and stemmed from the
broader concept of the ecological footprint. Third, I examine the development
of carbon footprint analysis as a vehicle for consumption-based carbon ac-
counting. This approach—which I label Carbon Footprint 2.0—expanded the
scope and potential policy remedies for addressing emissions. Fourth, I consid-
er how these approaches to consumer-oriented carbon footprints intersect with
broader discussions regarding international climate change policy.
Theoretical Framework: Accounting Processes and Governmentality
Studies
Carbon has become a commodity that is counted, traded, and offset at scales
ranging from the individual consumer to the nation-state since the mid-1990s.
Carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalencies have become the unit of exchange for a
range of greenhouse gas emissions.
In recent years, scholars have studied the growth of climate change gover-
nance and carbon markets with attention to the proliferation of actors and ven-
ues that have helped render carbon “a coherent object of governance.”7 Such
studies have examined the political economy of greenhouse gas consumption,
drawn on science and technology studies to consider the hybrid social-material
natures of carbon offsets, and governmentality studies to investigate the prac-
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tices and processes of climate governance.8 This paper draws on two theoretical
frameworks to approach the recent history of carbon footprints: a science stud-
ies approach to calculative processes and a governmentality studies approach to
the relationship between rationalities and technologies of governance.
As Callon has argued, the short history of carbon markets—and, by exten-
sion governance—is a story of the dynamic and changing relationship between
economics, science, and politics, which hinges on calculative tools.9 Central to
the development and functioning of carbon markets are the calculative pro-
cesses that render carbon governable. Callon and Muniesa offer three steps
for examining calculative processes, which I will describe as identiªcation,
transformation, and extraction in the context of calculating carbon footprints.
Identiªcation asks which entities are to be taken into account. Such entities have
to be “detached” and “moved, arranged, and ordered in a single space” to
answer the question: What activities count toward a carbon footprint? Manipula-
tion includes the processes by which those entities are subject to transforma-
tions that establish the relationship between them. In this case, such trans-
formations answer the question: How do these entities contribute to the carbon
footprint? Lastly, extraction is the generation of a new entity that results from the
“manipulations effected in the calculative space and, consequently, links the en-
tities taken into account.” Most importantly, the calculation “has to be able to
leave the calculative space and circulate elsewhere in an acceptable way (with-
out taking with it the whole calculative apparatus).”10 Such an approach de-
mands considering how the process of calculating carbon emissions is a product
of the complex and creative interactions between the economic, scientiªc, and
political, which has implications for how responsibility for climate change is al-
located, who bears the costs of mitigation, and what types of policy options are
considered.11
To examine the relationship between how a carbon footprint is calculated
and emissions are governed, this article draws on several precepts from govern-
mentality studies. First, it considers the practices of governance that are manifest
in venues other than the state alone by focusing on consumer-oriented carbon
footprint calculators, which are a product of non-governmental organizations,
corporations, scholars, and the state. Second, this approach considers the rela-
tionship between what Miller and Rose describe as “rationalities” and “technol-
ogies.” In short, how a problem is conceptualized and the tools for intervening
are designed amount to distinct but interdependent activities.12 As Miller and
Rose explain, this means considering the “intrinsic links between a way of repre-
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11. Callon 2009, 542–544.
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senting and knowing a phenomenon, on the one hand, and a way of acting
upon it so as to transform it, on the other.”13 Lastly, this approach considers the
ways that “modes of power” gain signiªcance as they are “linked up with other
comparable or similar modes.” Such an approach leads to the question: How
do efforts to establish consumer-oriented carbon footprints for individuals and
households intersect with efforts to calculate and assign responsibility for car-
bon footprints for a product, a corporation, or a nation-state?14
This approach builds on the work of other scholars who have adopted
governmentality studies to approach what Lövbrand and Stripple (2011) call the
“analytics of carbon accounting.” Lövbrand and Stripple consider three forms of
carbon governance: the national carbon sink, the carbon credit, and the per-
sonal carbon budget. Their approach shifts the focus of climate policy studies
away from large-scale policy and political negotiations to consider the “tech-
niques, tools, and methods that have turned carbon into a coherent object of
governance.”15 Paterson and Stripple adapt this analytical approach to consider
how individualized carbon practices, such as footprints, offsets, and diets, have
rapidly emerged as an important form of governance—“the conduct of carbon
conduct”—affecting individual carbon behavior. As they explain, rather than
serving to draw attention from collective efforts to address climate change, such
practices “articulate individuals as agents managing their own carbon practice in
relation to an articulated global public goal of minimizing climate change.”16
But what these studies have not fully addressed, as Lövbrand and Stripple ac-
knowledge, is how such approaches to counting carbon—whether at the indi-
vidual level or in the international community—play into the politics and pol-
icy choices central to climate governance.17
This analysis of carbon footprints extends such studies of the analytics of
carbon accounting in two ways that engage the political and policy implications
of counting carbon. Studies that have considered the carbon footprint have of-
ten understood it as a well-deªned and static concept that allows individuals to
both contextualize their contributions to climate change and take action to ad-
dress those emissions. Although such analyses are important, they overlook the
ways in which carbon footprints have been developed conceptually over time.
Since the late 1990s, the carbon footprint has been a dynamic concept, which
has helped precipitate new attention to consumption-based approaches to car-
bon accounting. Thus, carbon footprints are not important simply for their
functional value in engaging individuals in carbon governance, but as a site of
conceptual innovation in the analytics of carbon accounting. Second, many
studies of the analytics of carbon accounting are stratiªed, examining concepts
such as emissions credits or off-sets at different scales, such as the corporation
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or the nation-state, but giving less attention to the relationships between them.
Following Miller and Rose’s call to consider how modes of analysis gain impor-
tance as they are “linked up with other comparable or similar modes” at differ-
ent scales, this paper considers how the evolution of carbon footprints has inter-
sected with discussions of emissions responsibilities and mitigation at the
global level.18 Instead of viewing discussions over how carbon is counted as set-
tled, I examine how different approaches to counting carbon have signiªcant
implications for how responsibility for emissions are allocated and the policy
tools available to address such emissions.
Carbon Footprint 1.0: Carbon Footprint as a Subset of the Ecological
Footprint
Carbon footprints have become so ubiquitous in discussions of climate change
it is easy to take the term for granted, but the concept has a short history. Impor-
tant moments in this history include: In 2001, the World Resources Institute
launched one of the ªrst carbon calculators on the Internet at SafeClimate.net.
In 2003, Carbonfund paired an online carbon footprint calculator with its car-
bon offset program to encourage individual action. In 2005, BP, the energy
company, ran television advertisements in the US and Europe that asked con-
sumers, “What is your carbon footprint?” Despite these efforts, attention to the
concept was slow to develop. Only after the surge of attention to global warm-
ing in 2006 did public interest in carbon footprints begin to grow, peaking in
2008 when more than a dozen online carbon footprint calculators were avail-
able on the Internet from non-governmental organizations, such as The Nature
Conservancy and Carbonfund.org, governmental agencies, such as the US Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, and corporations, such as BP. The concept
reºected a well-developed body of scientiªc and social scientiªc knowledge re-
garding fossil fuels, CO2 emissions, and climate change. Initially, SafeClimate
adopted the term “carbon dioxide footprint,” but “carbon footprint” became
the default nomenclature by 2002.19 In turn, by emphasizing energy-related car-
bon emissions, the concept discounted other lesser-understood or indirect ways
in which individuals contributed to climate change.
A survey of twelve popular carbon footprint calculators revealed that all
followed a basic calculative methodology deployed by the Safeclimate.net calcu-
lator in 2001.20 Callon and Muniesa offer a useful framework for examining the
calculative process underlying these ªrst-generation calculators.21 The types of
activities identiªed as relevant were those that produced carbon emissions from
the burning of fossil fuels, such as home electricity use, home heating, and car
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and air travel. By relying on household utility records or personal estimates
(e.g., kilowatt-hours used, therms burned, miles driven), such usage could be
estimated relatively easily and accurately, and thus detached and moved into a
common calculative space. Once accounted for, each activity could be manipu-
lated using greenhouse gas intensity data for electricity generation (at the local,
regional, or national level) and fuels (natural gas, fuel oil, propane, gasoline, jet
fuel, etc.) to determine equivalent CO2 emissions. For instance, given annual
mileage and vehicle type, the calculator could divide the mileage by the vehicle’s
fuel efªciency (drawn from a government database) and multiply the fuel con-
sumption by the greenhouse gas intensity of gasoline to estimate emissions. The
ªnal result, summing up the consequences of the identiªed activities, was re-
ported as a single ªgure, a carbon footprint measured in tons of CO2 emissions,
which individuals were encouraged to extract as a basis for better understanding
their contribution to climate change (how did their emissions compare to
friends or a national average?) and for reducing or offsetting emissions (how
much would a more fuel-efªcient car reduce their footprint?). For the average
US household, Carbon Footprint 1.0-based calculators reported a footprint of
23.3 tons of CO2.22
What explains the scope of these ªrst-generation carbon footprint calcula-
tors? In part, the carbon footprint was derivative of the ecological footprint, a
broader concept that had been developed in the 1990s to account for an indi-
vidual’s resource consumption and waste assimilation requirements in terms of
the corresponding land area necessary to provide water, food, shelter, goods,
and energy.23 Most comparisons of the ecological and carbon footprints have fo-
cused on the major difference: the ecological footprint was conceived of in spa-
tial terms (hectares of land), but the carbon footprint is measured in units of
mass (such as tons of CO2).24 Carbon footprint calculators also borrowed from
the ecological footprint in three ways that have drawn less attention. First, the
ecological footprint highlighted the value of a metric that was scalable (ecologi-
cal footprints were calculated for individuals, cities, nations, and the globe) and
comparable (how did the ecological footprint of a New Zealander compare to
an American)? Second, the ecological footprint encouraged the strategy of car-
bon offsets, in which land was managed to sequester carbon emissions. Third,
SafeClimate.net described its approach as a subset of the ecological footprint.25
Whereas the ecological footprint focused broadly on energy consumption, the
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carbon footprint was a narrower metric, which included only emissions linked
to fossil-fuel use for heating, transportation, and electricity generation. These
became the default categories for most carbon footprint calculators.
The careful observer would have ascertained the limitations of early car-
bon footprint calculators: they were both limited in scope and accuracy. Al-
though SafeClimate.net described the carbon footprint as “the effect you . . .
have on the climate in terms of the total amount of greenhouse gases you pro-
duce (measured in units of carbon dioxide),” it acknowledged that the calcula-
tors accounted for only 40 percent of emissions.26 Emissions resulting from
other activities, such as the consumption of food, the purchase of clothing or
appliances, or attending a movie, were omitted. In part, such omissions were
practical: for consumers, quantifying such activities could be difªcult (com-
pared to reading a utility bill or estimating annual auto mileage); for calcula-
tors, translating such a wide array of potential data—from the consumption of
fruits and vegetables to paying for mobile phone service—into emissions was a
challenge.
Calculators also adopted different approaches to assessing the emissions
consequences of activities such as electricity generation (were emissions inten-
sity data aggregated at the national, state, or utility level?), air travel (how were
the radiative forcing effects of jet contrails handled?), and gasoline consump-
tion (did emissions data include upstream reªning of the fuel?). In most cases,
as Paterson and Stripple have noted, calculators defaulted to the simplest meth-
odology.27 Estimating the carbon footprint for electricity consumption, house-
hold heating, and travel using emissions factors from ªve carbon footprint cal-
culators resulted in estimates that ranged from 22.5 to 25.8 metric tons of
CO2.28 Such uncertainties and variation received little attention on carbon foot-
print websites, however. Instead, how carbon footprints were reported empha-
sized their precision and validity. SafeClimate.net, like other calculators, re-
ported the footprint as a single ªgure, not as a range or with a margin of error
(although the supporting documentation usually described the footprint as an
“estimate”). In this way, the carbon footprint tapped into what Theodore Porter
has described as the “prestige and power of quantitative methods”—by reduc-
ing climate change to a speciªc ªgure meaningful at an individual level.29
Compared to most discussions of climate change policy, which hinged on the
uncertainties inherent in long-term projections of the earth-climate system,
the carbon footprint was seemingly concrete; it was data an individual could
act on.
This strategy aligned with the entrepreneurial efforts of both non-
governmental organizations and government agencies to make the global prob-
lem of climate change tractable for individuals. As a result, carbon footprints
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became a well-publicized tool by which individuals could both assess their con-
tribution to global warming and take action to address it. Most calculators
placed such results in a comparative context. For some Americans, the realiza-
tion that their footprint was ªfteen times greater than that of the average Indian
would be motivation to take action. To encourage such action, carbon footprint
calculators most often emphasized consumer-based actions, such as improving
energy efªciency or offsetting carbon emissions. For instance, SafeClimate.net
highlighted switching to green electricity providers, purchasing more efªcient
products and appliances, or choosing a more fuel-efªcient vehicle.30 The
EPA calculator promoted EnergyStar appliances and products, such as refrigera-
tors, furnaces, light bulbs, and windows.31 Carbon offset providers aggres-
sively linked carbon footprint measurements with offset options. “It’s simple,”
explained Carbonfund.org. “Estimate your carbon footprint. Donate to offset
it.” For $68.82, Carbonfund.org promised to offset 12.5 metric tons of carbon.32
I label this approach to counting carbon, which emphasizes activities as-
sociated with fossil-fuel use, as Carbon Footprint 1.0. It succeeded in translating
a problem that turns on a global commons, invisible emissions, and future con-
sequences to a scale that was meaningful for individuals. Approaching Carbon
Footprint 1.0 as a form of government rationality makes clear that this ap-
proach is important not just for enabling the “conduct of carbon conduct,” but
also for constraining how individuals have understood their conduct in relation
to carbon emissions.33 In general, Carbon Footprint 1.0 reduced climate change
to an energy problem. Thus, in the case of individuals, carbon footprint calcula-
tors encouraged consumer-based actions, such as improving energy efªciency
(through purchasing high-efªciency light bulbs, appliances, or vehicles) or adopt-
ing household solar technology (without considering the carbon consequences
of manufacturing and installing such a system). Such a framework, however, of-
fered little basis for or reason to consider other approaches, such as changing diet,
retaining appliances until the end of their useful life cycle, or changing waste
management strategies. Carbon Footprint 1.0 remains an important approach to
individual climate governance: in 2012, nine of the ten most popular carbon
footprint calculators still followed this basic methodology.34
Carbon Footprint 2.0: Greenhouse Gas Emissions as an Extension of
Economic-Input Analysis
Even while public interest in carbon footprint calculators grew after 2006—as it
was popularly described as a way to allow individuals to do their part in the
ªght against climate change—academics, corporations, and policymakers were
James Morton Turner • 67
30. World Resources Institute 2004b.
31. USEPA Ofªce of Atmospheric Programs 2007.
32. CarbonFund.org 2004.
33. Paterson and Stripple 2010, 348.
34. This is based on a review of the top ten calculators returned by a Google search for “carbon foot-
print calculator” conducted on September 10, 2012.
actively reconsidering the concept. Scholars warned that the proliferation of car-
bon footprints had resulted in inconsistent and potentially conºicting ap-
proaches to greenhouse gas accounting that would undermine the value of the
metric.35 Several concerns informed such warnings: First, were discrepancies
among carbon footprint calculators that resulted from different assumptions re-
garding the emissions consequences of various modes of travel, heating, and
electricity generation.36 Second, most existing carbon footprint inventories
omitted emissions associated with the consumption of food, goods, and ser-
vices. Concerns about such emissions grew after studies suggested that common
consumer products, such as beef, had signiªcant carbon footprints.37 Third,
scholars had begun to demonstrate that trade-related emissions—described as
“carbon leakage”—might have consequences for international climate policy.38
Efforts to address shortcomings in existing carbon footprint methodology and
to extend the scope of carbon footprint analysis contributed to the advent of
consumption-based approaches to greenhouse gas inventories—which I label
Carbon Footprint 2.0.
A leading example of this newer generation of consumer-oriented calcula-
tors is the CoolClimate Carbon Footprint Calculator.39 It took a different ap-
proach than Carbon Footprint 1.0 calculators to establishing the calculative
space important to a carbon footprint. Instead of identifying speciªc sectors most
important to the carbon footprint, the CoolClimate Calculator identiªed all
household expenditures as relevant. To assess the consequences of household
expenditures, the calculator manipulated such data by translating income into
estimated household expenditures across economic sectors, using data on aver-
age household spending (based on household size, income, and geographical
location). Such expenditures were then combined with greenhouse gas intensity
data for speciªc economic sectors to yield estimated emissions in CO2.
Summing up the emissions associated with each economic sector yielded the
household’s carbon footprint. The CoolClimate Carbon Footprint Calculator
reported that the average US household has a carbon footprint of 49 tons of
CO2 (more twice the average footprint reported by Carbon Footprint 1.0 calcu-
lators). The extraction of this ªgure was not as simple as in the case of Carbon
Footprint 1.0, however. Although this result was presented without reference to
the uncertainties inherent in the analysis, individuals were encouraged to reªne
the initial estimate by providing more speciªc information, such as detailing a
range of activities and consumption habits. These included those common in
Carbon Footprint 1.0 calculators, such as travel, home heating, and electricity,
and additional categories, such as calories of food consumed (meat, dairy, fruits
and vegetables, etc.), dollars of goods purchased (clothing, furniture, other
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goods), or dollars of services paid for (health care, entertainment, education,
etc.).
This broader framework for generating knowledge about activities relevant
to climate governance was related to the expanding scope of the “conduct of car-
bon conduct.” Most obviously, the broader scope of activities identiªed as rele-
vant to climate change contributed to a wider range of potential individual ac-
tions. For instance, the CoolClimate calculator recommended nineteen
potential actions ranked by economic savings, including going on a low-carbon
diet, upgrading vehicle efªciency, and telecommuting to work. In comparison
to Carbon Footprint 1.0 calculators, options such as purchasing green energy or
offsetting emissions were ranked lower because they generate no economic
beneªt for the individual. Moreover, unlike Carbon Footprint 1.0, which only
included emissions related to energy use, Carbon Footprint 2.0’s recommenda-
tions weighed reductions from energy use against the indirect emissions result-
ing from consuming new goods and services. For instance, in the case of pur-
chasing a fuel-efªcient automobile, it factored in emissions from reduced fuel
consumption, but also indirect emissions associated with sourcing, manufac-
turing, and disposing of the automobile. Lastly, Carbon Footprint 2.0 made evi-
dent the challenges of translating individual action into signiªcant change. For
instance, implementing a top recommendation, such as changing diet, would
only reduce the average household’s footprint by 3.5 percent.
Scholarly research on life-cycle analysis informs the approach of Carbon
Footprint 2.0 calculators. In 2007, industrial ecologists Thomas Wiedmann and
Jan Minx called for a reconceptualization of carbon footprint methodology that
was grounded in scholarly research in industrial ecology and extended eco-
nomic input-output analyses. In place of the limited approach represented by
Carbon Footprint 1.0, they suggested a more comprehensive approach to car-
bon footprints that included “the exclusive total amount of carbon dioxide
emissions that is directly and indirectly caused by an activity or is accumulated
over the life stages of a product.”40 By deªning emissions in reference to activi-
ties, this deªnition implicated a wide range of actors in climate governance, in-
cluding individuals, households, cities, or nations, since activities might include
burning fuel to heat an individual home or fuel to heat the homes of a nation.
By deªning emissions in reference to products, this deªnition also included the
emissions that were embodied in, or the consequence of, products or services,
which might be consumed by an individual, manufactured by a company, or
traded across national borders.
The approach that Wiedmann and Minx called for has emerged as the
foundation for new approaches to counting carbon at the household, institu-
tional, and national scales. Notably, such approaches shared a common calcula-
tive approach grounded in economic input-output analysis. The most prevalent
approach to life-cycle analysis has been process-based, meaning that assessing a
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carbon footprint required identifying and measuring the physical inputs and
outputs related to emissions at all stages, from production of raw materials,
through manufacturing, and including use and ultimate disposal. But such
an approach is laborious, particularly when the goal is to aggregate emissions
from consumption, whether for a household or nation.41 The turn toward
consumption-based accounting depended upon a complementary methodol-
ogy, grounded in economic input-output analysis. Input-output analysis is a ªeld of
economics that dates to the 1930s. Put simply, it quantiªes the interactions be-
tween different sectors of the economy by measuring the consequences of a unit
of activity in one sector of the economy, such as purchasing an automobile, in
other sectors of the economy, such as mining, manufacturing, advertising, ship-
ping, or retail. This approach can be extended to estimate the environmental
consequences of activities in each of those sectors (an extended input-output
analysis), such as greenhouse gas emissions, which are reported as the emis-
sions per unit of economic activity.42 The most important advantage of eco-
nomic input-output analysis is that comprehensive life-cycle analyses can be
completed relatively efªciently by drawing on input-output datasets detailing
economic activity (and related environmental impacts) that are economy wide
and based on government statistics, without the product-by-product or activity-
by-activity analysis necessary in a process-based approach. Such an approach
comes at the expense of accuracy, however: extended input-output datasets
are updated infrequently, the data is aggregated by economic sector, and there
may be inconsistencies across datasets that complicate comparisons.43 The
CoolClimate Footprint Calculator employed a hybrid approach, using input-
output analysis to estimate the initial footprint, which could then be reªned
with additional information and, in some cases, process-based analysis.44
Approached as a form of governance, Carbon Footprint 2.0 signiªcantly
expanded the scope of activities relevant to carbon governance and the array
of potential strategies for mitigating climate change. In the case of the individ-
ual, it shifted attention from energy consumption—through conservation, ef-
ªciency, and off-setting—to considering those activities and, in addition and
relative to, the consequences of consuming food, goods, products and other ser-
vices. For many individuals, the most signiªcant step to reducing their footprint
would not be changing home heating or travel, but changing dietary habits. The
result was an expanded suite of strategies for addressing climate change, but
also the realization that signiªcant change is difªcult when nearly every action
is subject to “the conduct of carbon conduct.”
Since 2008, such consumption-based approaches to counting carbon have
been gaining attention. The CoolCarbon Footprint Calculator has become the
basis for other calculators, such as that deployed by the World Wildlife Fund.
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Numerous corporations have taken steps to extend their emissions assessments
beyond direct energy consumption, to consider the emissions consequences of
individual products and related supply chains. For instance, a hybrid approach
to carbon footprint assessment—drawing on both process-based and economic
input-output analysis—underlies the Greenhouse Gas Protocol Product Stan-
dard, developed by the World Resources Institute in 2011 to guide corporate as-
sessments of individual products. In addition, consumption-based approaches
to greenhouse gas accounting have been a focus of recent scholarship and
gained attention in international policy discussions. For instance, governments
and institutions, including the state of Oregon, the British Parliament, and the
World Trade Organization, have engaged in formal discussions regarding con-
sumption-based greenhouse gas inventories.
A Transition from Carbon Footprint 1.0 to 2.0?
The comparison of Carbon Footprint 1.0 and 2.0 demonstrates that carbon
footprints have done more than just engage individuals in climate change; they
have also served as sites of innovation with respect to how carbon emissions are
assessed. To fully understand the signiªcance of this alternative arena of carbon
governance, however, it is necessary to consider how it intersects with broader
discussions of climate politics and policy. As Miller and Rose argue, such
“modes of power” gain signiªcance as they are “linked up with other compara-
ble or other similar modes.”45 Governmentality studies highlights “how traces
are left, linkages formed, connections established and some degree of stability is
achieved in an assemblage.”46 The research on consumption-based approaches
to allocating greenhouse gas emissions has been embedded in broader shifts in
climate change politics and policy. This is not to suggest that developments at
the individual level have driven this transition; instead it is to suggest that these
shifting approaches to the analytics of carbon accounting at different scales are
interrelated. Considering these synergies offers the opportunity to consider how
the “analytics of carbon” play into the politics and policy choices central to cli-
mate governance.47
Although the allocation of responsibility for international carbon emis-
sions under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol is more comprehensive (including domestic
agriculture, land use change, and other categories), it aligns with the scope of
Carbon Footprint 1.0 in important ways. The protocol assigned nation-states re-
sponsibility for direct emissions resulting from activities within the boundaries
of the nation-state and its territory; similarly, Carbon Footprint 1.0 assigned in-
dividuals responsibility for emissions associated with household energy con-
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sumption and travel. The protocol did not assign nation-states responsibility for
emissions embodied in the trade of food, goods, and services; similarly, Carbon
Footprint 1.0 omitted household consumption of food, goods, and services.
There are two exceptions: nation-states and individuals are responsible for
1) indirect emissions resulting from imports or purchases of electricity and
2) emissions from the combustion of imported fossil fuels (exporting nations
only bear responsibility for the domestic emissions associated with fossil-fuel
production).48 At the global level, this approach is based on the premise that na-
tion-states should be responsible for the emissions directly associated with do-
mestic economic activities. Following this methodology, the EU claimed in
2008 that it was on track to successfully meet its obligations under the Kyoto
Protocol; the EU-15’s emissions were 6.9 percent below the 1990 baseline. Al-
though that drop was partly a result of the global economic recession, EU
ofªcials emphasized the success of both the EU’s energy policies and the Kyoto
Protocol.49 Nonetheless, during the same time period, global greenhouse gas
emissions grew 40 percent.50
These divergent trends highlight one of the most important political com-
promises and problematic structural features of the Kyoto Protocol: the two-tier
system that distinguishes between developed and developing countries’ respon-
sibility for greenhouse gas emissions under the principle of common but differ-
entiated responsibility. Speciªcally, as a result of political compromise, develop-
ing countries, such as China, Brazil, and India, were exempt from the initial
round of greenhouse gas reduction commitments, since they had done less to
contribute to global warming historically, while developed countries, such as
the US and the EU, were meant to commit to emissions reductions. Since the
late 1990s, scholars had warned that distinction could lead to “carbon leakage,”
whereby greenhouse-gas–intensive activities would be shifted from developed
to developing countries.51 A series of studies after 2006 revealed that such trade-
related emissions were an important factor in global carbon emissions.52 For in-
stance, a 2010 study indicated that 23 percent of China’s 2004 emissions were
driven by export-oriented activities, most of which met demand in developed
countries; for some developed countries, imports—unaccounted for under Car-
bon Footprint 1.0—increased domestic emissions by 20–50 percent.53
When climate change negotiations broke down in Copenhagen in 2009
over the divide between developed and developing countries, Carbon Footprint
2.0 gained in political relevance. As Davis and Caldeira explain, “to the extent
that constraints on emissions in developing countries are the major impedi-
ment to effective international climate policy, allocating responsibility for some
72 • Counting Carbon
48. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 1996.
49. Europa 2010.
50. Data drawn from World Resources Institute-CAIT Database 2010.
51. Paltsev 2001.
52. Mongelli et al. 2006; Peters and Hertwich 2008; van Asselt and Brewer 2010.
53. Davis and Caldeira 2010.
portion of these emissions to ªnal consumers elsewhere may represent an op-
portunity for compromise.”54 Yunfeng and Laike put the point sharply in a
study of China’s export-related greenhouse gas emissions, arguing that “those
who consume the goods made in China should also share responsibility.”55 For
example, under Carbon Footprint 1.0, if the US converted its ºeet of automo-
biles to hybrid automobiles made in China, the US would see a decrease in
emissions from fuel consumption, while the emissions associated with manu-
facturing the vehicles would be assigned to China. Under Carbon Footprint 2.0,
however, the emissions consequences of the vehicles’ lifecycle would be as-
signed to the US. As a result, argue Yunfeng and Laike, “in the global environ-
mental negotiations, China should claim the consumption-based CO2 account-
ing system.”56
Although the most prominent argument for consumption-based account-
ing is based on more equitably distributing responsibility for emissions be-
tween developed and developing countries, proponents also argue that such a
shift offers other advantages. First, Carbon Footprint 2.0 is grounded in a
calculative process that can more consistently account for consumption-related
emissions at multiple scales, from the individual to the nation-state. Second,
Carbon Footprint 2.0 addresses the problem of orphaned international emis-
sions, such as those from international shipping and transport, since those
emissions are allocated based on the consumption of those services (rather than
falling through the cracks as they do in Carbon Footprint 1.0 approaches, since
they occur outside the boundaries of any one country).57 Third, Carbon Foot-
print 2.0 provides a more comprehensive assessment of emissions associated
with a wider range of fuel sources, particularly biofuels. Under Carbon Foot-
print 1.0, biofuels are often treated as renewable and, therefore, zero-carbon at
the point of combustion; in contrast, a Carbon Footprint 2.0 approach consid-
ers associated emissions across the lifecycle of biofuels.58 Fourth, Carbon Foot-
print 2.0 is amenable to a carbon tax, since it potentially allows for the taxation
of goods and services based on carbon emissions (which is important in
the case of imports from a country without a carbon tax).59 Finally, Carbon
Footprint 2.0 helps expand the scope of policy initiatives beyond energy
management—largely focused on directly reining in fossil-fuel emissions
through energy efªciency, alternative energy development, and transportation
policy—to include a wider array of consumption-based approaches—such as re-
ducing food waste, increasing the durability of goods, changing recycling and
waste management practices, and addressing trade policy.60
The concerns raised in response to Carbon Footprint 2.0 approaches are
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both methodological and pragmatic. First, unlike the international protocols
for reporting emissions under the UNFCCC, which have been codiªed and for-
mally recognized by the international community, Carbon Footprint 2.0 re-
mains under-developed as a calculative process.61 Second, adopting a Carbon
Footprint 2.0 approach would increase the burden on developed countries, fur-
ther complicating support for climate policy in countries such as the US. Third,
while Carbon Footprint 2.0 does shift responsibility for emissions from export-
ers (often developing countries) to importers (often developed countries), such
a shift could create new barriers to trade. If carbon is priced sufªciently high, de-
veloped countries may expand domestic production to the potential disadvan-
tage of developing countries’ export economies.62 Such concerns help explain
why countries such as China and India have been slow to embrace Carbon Foot-
print 2.0. The most pointed objection to Carbon Footprint 2.0 has been ad-
vanced by those concerned with the political consequences for the international
policy process. Some policymakers have suggested that integrating Carbon
Footprint 2.0 methodology into climate governance could be a “huge distrac-
tion” to international negotiations and such an “attempt would delay an effec-
tive solution on climate change potentially for years or even decades.”63 With an
eye toward a post-Kyoto framework, they urge policymakers to forge ahead and
negotiate a global emissions reduction treaty based on existing calculative pro-
cesses codiªed under the UNFCCC.
Conclusion
This paper has described two broad approaches to calculating carbon
emissions—Carbon Footprint 1.0, which prioritizes emissions from fossil-fuel
and electricity use, and Carbon Footprint 2.0, which also includes indirect emis-
sions through consumption-based analysis—both of which are relevant to cli-
mate governance at scales ranging from the individual consumer to interna-
tional climate policy. Where other studies have focused on the role of carbon
footprints in enabling individual action on climate change, this analysis reveals
that the carbon footprint has been a dynamic site of policy experimentation and
innovation, which has emerged in conjunction with changes in the politics and
policy of carbon accounting. As this article demonstrates, there is an intrinsic re-
lationship between the calculative processes underlying carbon accounting and
potential policy strategies. This is important to future efforts to forge climate
policy in two respects.
First, how carbon is counted has implications for how actors, from con-
sumers to nation-states, approach mitigating those emissions. Carbon Footprint
1.0 emphasizes strategies aimed at curbing energy-related emissions by improv-
74 • Counting Carbon
61. U.K. House of Commons 2012.
62. Eckersley 2010; Shrubsole 2011, 7–9.
63. U.K. House of Commons 2012.
ing energy efªciency, promoting alternative energy sources, and changing trans-
portation policy, while omitting emissions associated with the consumption of
food, goods, and services. As a result, Carbon Footprint 1.0 does not weigh en-
ergy efªciency gains against related economic activities, such as sourcing, manu-
facturing, or transporting such goods and services. Carbon Footprint 2.0, in
contrast, not only includes the emissions reductions due to displacing fossil-
fuel consumption with solar panels, for example; it also includes the emissions
resulting from the lifecycle of the panels. This approach highlights other poten-
tial policy levers related to the consumption of goods, products, and services,
such as changing dietary habits and agricultural policies, improving waste man-
agement and recycling practices, and adopting policies aimed at affecting con-
sumer habits, such as lengthening the life cycle of durable goods.
Second, how carbon is counted has important implications for the alloca-
tion of responsibility for climate change. By accounting for emissions embed-
ded in consumption and trade, Carbon Footprint 2.0 offers an alternative
framework for negotiating the joint responsibility that consumers and produc-
ers or importing nations and exporting nations bear for emissions. Rather than
simply allocating responsibility at the site of energy use, as is generally the case
under Carbon Footprint 1.0, or the ultimate site of product consumption, as is
suggested by Carbon Footprint 2.0, these approaches in combination offer an
opportunity to distribute responsibility for carbon emissions more equitably, as
has been suggested by other scholars.64 The basis for such a compromise is an
area that demands further discussion, both among scholars and policymakers.
Some observers have argued that initiating such discussions will only serve to
delay efforts to address climate change. Indeed, it is unlikely that Carbon Foot-
print 2.0 will displace Carbon Footprint 1.0 in the international climate regime.
But, equally important, it is unlikely that Carbon Footprint 2.0, which has al-
ready gained relevance at the individual, product, corporate, and global level,
can be kept on the sidelines of international policy discussions. This paper dem-
onstrates that how to count carbon remains an unsettled issue that urgently re-
quires further interdisciplinary discussion and analysis.
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